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MIDWIFERY AND MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: A
PROFESSION FIGHTS FOR SURVIVAL
GAIL A. ROBINSONt
[Subsequent to the completion of this Comment, the Ameri-
can College of Nurse-Midwives decided to self-insure,* thus
adopting the proposal this Comment advocates. Nonetheless,
we have decided to publish the Comment because it ad-
dresses important legal and social issues.]
"MIDWIVES FACING LOSS OF INSURANCE."' Similar
headlines across the country announce the newest danger threatening
both midwives who wish to practice their profession and consumers
who seek their services.' In May 1985, the major carrier of malpractice
insurance for nurse-midwives decided that it would not renew a blanket
policy covering more than fifty percent of the members of the American
College of Nurse-Midwives (ACNM).3 To date, the ACNM, the na-
f B.A. 1984, Rutgers University; J.D. Candidate 1987, University of
Pennsylvania.
* On December 15, 1985, the American College of Nurse Midwives (ACNM)
made the following announcement: "The threat of a service interruption by the nation's
nurse-midwives will be averted by the establishment of an independent mutual insur-
ance company to be managed specifically on behalf of certified nurse-midwives ...
The new plan will go into effect next April 1 [1986]." Nurse-Midwives Solve Insur-
ance Crisis, Avert Breakdown in Maternity Services, Press Release of the American
College of Nurse Midwives, Dec. 15, 1985 [on file with the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review]. Details of the plan are still being worked out by the ACNM. Telephone
interview with Karen Ehrnman, Government Relations Coordinator, ACNM (Feb. 6,
1986).
1 Lawson, Midwives Facing Loss of Insurance, N.Y. Times, June 13, 1985, at
C3, col. 1.
2 See Kolbert, Midwives Face Threat of High Insurance Cost, N.Y. Times, Sept.
29, 1985, at A56, col. 1; Quarembo, Insurance Costs Shut Down Birthing Center,
Philadelphia Bus. J., Sept. 23-29, 1985, at 1, col. 2; Malpractice and Midwives,
Washington Post, July 6, 1985, at A18, col. 1; Waldholz, Group of Midwives May
Lose Coverage From Its Insurer, Wall St. J., June 7, 1985, at 11, col. 2.
' The ACNM, the iiational organization of nurse-midwives, has a current mem-
bership of about 2,500, which is approximately 85% of the profession. American Col-
lege of Nurse-Midwives, Fact Sheet: Nurse-Midwivet and the Malpractice Insurance
Crisis 1-2 (rev. Oct. 1, 1985) [on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Re-
view]. It has provided a group insurance policy to its members since the early 1970's.
See K. McHugh, Eastern Pennsylvania Chapter, ACNM, Testimony on the Scarcity
and High Cost of Insurance Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation, and
Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (Sept.
19, 1985) [unpublished manuscript on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review].
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tional organization of nurse-midwives, has been unable to find a new
insurance carrier. Consequently, almost all of these midwives have been
left without insurance.
Other nurse-midwives' are also having difficulty obtaining mal-
practice insurance. Although many are affiliated with hospitals and
physicians that provide malpractice coverage, these policies may not
shield them from personal liability, thus requiring them to carry their
own professional liability insurance. 5 Furthermore, a number of possi-
ble options to the group ACNM plan have been dosed off to nurse-
midwives through the actions of insurers.6
The insurance problem is not peculiar to midwives, but rather is
of concern to the entire medical profession.7 That midwifery services
are threatened now, however, is particularly ironic, since in the last
decade midwives and their supporters have won a number of legal bat-
tles that have saved midwives from near extinction.8
4 A distinction must be made between nurse-midwives and lay midwives. The
former are educated in both nursing and midwifery and are certified by the ACNM.
Lay midwives usually receive little formal training and learn their craft through expe-
rience. See K. McHugh, supra note 3, at 3-4. The problem of obtaining affordable
malpractice insurance primarily concerns nurse-midwives rather than lay midwives,
since the status of lay midwives is less clear, and many are practicing illegally. See
infra notes 27 & 34.
See K. McHugh, supra note 3, at 9.
6 In states where nurse-midwives practice in conformity with the state nurse prac-
tice act, see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 43-26-32 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-7-105
(Supp. 1985), the American Nurses Association's (ANA) group insurance policy would
have covered nurse-midwives, except that the ANA's insurer wrote in an exclusion for
nurse-midwives effective November 1985. The policy held by the Nurses' Association
of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists was also changed recently
to exclude nurse-midwives. See K. McHugh, supra note 3, at 9-10.
' For discussions of the malpractice problem facing the medical profession in gen-
eral, see Defensive Medicine and Medical Malpractice: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) [hereinafter
cited as Defensive Medicine Hearing]; U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE,
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1973)
[hereinafter cited as HEW REPORT]; Lehman, The Cost of Doing Business, Boston
Globe, Aug. 26, 1985, at 43, col. 2; Gargan, Albany Tackles Thorny Malpractice In-
surance Issue, N.Y. Times, June 20, 1985, at B7, col. 1.
Like doctors, most nurse-midwives will not practice without malpractice insur-
ance. Some type of malpractice insurance is carried by 95% of the members of the
ACNM. See K. McHugh, supra note 3, at 4.
S Midwives have been successful in getting relatively favorable licensing laws
passed in many states, see infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text, and have led
successful campaigns for approval of payments under Medicaid and for laws in individ-
ual states mandating payment for their services, see infra notes 41-43 and accompany-
ing text. In addition, at least one suit has been brought against doctors and a hospital
that tried to interfere with midwife services. See Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett,
549 F. Supp. 1185 (M.D. Tenn. 1982). There has also been a congressional hearing on
the problems facing midwives trying to establish a practice. See Nurse Midwifery: Con-
sumers' Freedom of Choice: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investiga-
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Midwives must remain a viable option for two reasons. First, they
provide a safe alternative to the medical model of birth, which encour-
ages the use of drugs and technology even for normal births.9 Second,
they provide prenatal and intrapartum care 0 to women who cannot
afford the high fees of doctors and hospitals and who, without mid-
wives, might have no care at all.""
This Comment explores the malpractice insurance problem cur-
rently facing midwives. Part I reviews the history of American mid-
wifery. Part II discusses the benefits of a strong midwifery profession.
Part III presents the malpractice problem both in general and as it
applies to midwives, analyzing suggested changes to the present insur-
ance system. Finally, Part IV proposes a solution to the midwives' in-
surance problem.
tions of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Nurse-Midwifeiy Hearing].
" Many commentators claim that the current dependence of the medical profession
on drugs and modern technology is both unnecessary and dangerous. See Nurse-Mid-
wifery Hearing, supra note 8, at 91-93 (testimony of C. Arden Miller, M.D., Chair-
man, Dep't of Maternal and Child Health, University of North Carolina); id. at 94-
121 (reprinting C. Miller, What Technology Breeds: A Review of Recent U.S. Experi-
ence with Caesarean Section (Mar. 20, 1978) (John Sundwall Memorial Lecture,
School of Public Health, University of Michigan)); id. at 145-47 (testimony of Judith
Rooks, C.N.M., M.S., M.P.H., Former Consultant, Office of Population Affairs,
Dep't of Health and Human Services); B. ROTHMAN, IN LABOR: WOMEN AND
POWER IN THE BIRTHPLACE 45-47 (1982).
10 Prenatal care is care given to a woman and the fetus during pregnancy,
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1293 (24th ed. 1966); intrapartum care is care
given during labor and delivery, id. at 822.
" Midwives generally charge about half the fee of an obstetrician. See Waldholz,
supra note 2, at 11, col. 2. In the home-birth situation, hospital fees are eliminated as
well.
In addition to charging lower fees, midwives have a history of assisting the poor.
One of the first midwifery centers in the United States was the Frontier Nursing Ser-
vice in Eastern Kentucky, established in 1925. The Service provided health care to a
poor, mountainous region of Kentucky and may be credited with significant improve-
ments in health. See C. Miller, What Technology Breeds: A Review of Recent U.S.
Experience with Caesarean Section (Mar. 20, 1978) (John Sundwall Memorial Lec-
ture, School of Public Health, University of Michigan), reprinted in Nurse-Midwifery
Hearing, supra note 8, at 94, 114. Midwives' historical concern for the poor continues
today. See Spending Reduction Proposals (Part II): Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 340-42 (1981) (testimony of Sally Tom,
C.N.M., Government Liaison, ACNM) (discussing the successful results that midwives
have had in poor, rural areas) [hereinafter cited as Spending Reduction Hearings];
Piechnik & Corbett, Reducing Low Birth Weight Among Socioeconomically High-Risk
Adolescent Pregnancies, 30 J. NURSE-MIDWIFERY 88 (1985) (study showing a signifi-
cantly lower incidence of low-birth-weight infants of pregnant adolescents under certi-
fied nurse-midwife care); Tom, Political Midwifery, 27 J. NURSE-MIDWIFERY 19, 19-
20 (1982) (discussing the responsibility of nurse-midwives to serve "out-of-power"
peoples).
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I. THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN MIDWIFERY
A. From Dominance to Extinction
The female midwife 2 was the only accepted birth attendant for
centuries.1 The birth process was thought to be the sole province of the
female. It was not until the middle of the eighteenth century that men
in the American colonies became involved in the process.14 Once male
doctors realized the economic and professional advantages of dominat-
ing the birth field, however, they worked hard to convince women that
the only safe means of giving birth was with an attendant physician."
This monopolization campaign took several forms. The American
Medical Association (AMA) was founded as a vehicle to promote the
economic and social advancement of medicine.1" It was highly success-
ful in getting restrictive licensing laws passed that helped secure the
exclusive right of doctors to practice medicine.17 Once assisting with
12 A midwife is defined as "a woman who assists women in childbirth." RANDOM
HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 908 (unabridged ed. 1983).
" See J. DONEGAN, WOMEN AND MEN MIDWIVES: MEDICINE, MORALITY AND
MISOGYNY IN EARLY AMERICA 9-33 (1978) (discussing the origins of midwifery in
England). For additional history on English midwifery and the influence of technology
on the birth process, see generally A. OAKLEY, THE CAPTURED WOMB: A HISTORY
OF THE MEDICAL CARE OF PREGNANT WOMEN (1984). For a study of childbirth in
traditional tribal cultures, see generally J. GOLDSMITH, CHILDBIRTH WISDOM (1984).
Goldsmith suggests that Westerners, who often view birth as a pathological occur-
rence-a disease rather than a natural process-can learn a considerable amount from
the tribal cultures' attitude toward birth. See id. at 182-87.
14 See M. EDWARDS & M. WALDORF, RECLAIMING BIRTH: HISTORY AND HER-
OINES OF AMERICAN CHILDBIRTH REFORM 149 (1984). One of the major reasons that
men began to dominate the birth process was the introduction of the use of forceps to
assist in birth. These new instruments were given much credit for easing the difficulties
of birth, but they remained almost exclusively in the hands of male doctors and sur-
geons. Female midwives were given neither the instruction in the use of forceps nor the
training in anatomy and surgery that was necessary to utilize the instruments correctly.
See id.; see also W. ARNEY, POWER AND THE PROFESSION OF OBSTETRICS 47 (1982)
("[T]he 'prophylactic forceps operation' . . . obliterated the boundary between normal
and abnormal and allowed male midwives to take over, conceptually and instrumen-
tally, the domain of the midwife.") (citation omitted); J. DONEGAN, supra note 13, at
59 (discussing the surgeons' exclusive use of the forceps as a means of maintaining a
superior status).
'" See W. ARNEY, supra note 14, at 42-47 (suggesting that doctors gained control
over the birth process by creating a pathological theory of pregnancy and fostering an
image of obstetrics as a complicated specialty); M. EDWARDS & M. WALDORF, supra
note 14, at 151-57 (discussing the societal changes that led to the use of male birth
attendants).
16 See M. EDWARDS & M. WALDORF, supra note 14, at 151.
17 See id. at 151. For examples of current licensing laws, see CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 2052 (West Supp. 1986) (prohibiting treatment or diagnosis by uncertified
practitioners); COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-36-106(2) (1978) (requiring a license to prac-
tice medicine); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:9-6 (West 1978 & Supp. 1985) (requiring a
license to practice medicine or surgery); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 421.3 (Purdon
[Vol. 134:1001
MIDWIFERY AND INSURANCE
birth was viewed as practicing medicine, midwives, by virtue of the
licensing laws, were excluded from this role.
Industrialization, by reducing the need for women's domestic la-
bor, also assisted physicians in their quest for dominance:
Working-class women left home often to work in factories
and mills, while middle and upper-class women were left
without any vital function except that of bearing children.
Under enforced leisure and tightly-laced, unhealthy fash-
ions . . . women of privilege slipped into chronic invalidism,
requiring frequent medical visits.1 8
The need for frequent care created yet another opportunity for male
doctors to convince women that they were dependent upon the medical
profession and that it alone could offer relief from the danger and pain
of childbirth. By the 1930's physicians had succeeded in persuading
women to use only medically trained physicians as birth attendants,
thereby causing midwives to appear as a wholly inferior choice, used
only by those too poor or too ignorant to get a doctor.19
Consistent with the physicians' position that women were depen-
dent on male birth attendants for a successful birth, the medical model
views normal birth as a pathological occurrence that necessitates medi-
cal interference. Under this model, the doctor delivers the baby, and the
mother is merely the receptacle from which it emerges.
2 0
The first stirrings against this medical monopoly and the model of
birth it represented came in the 1950's with the Lamaze technique of
"painless childbirth. '21 Women who before had been in a state of "twi-
light sleep"22 during birth were now encouraged to remain awake and
Supp. 1985) (prohibiting the unlicensed practice of medicine and surgery).
1S M. EDWARDS & M. WALDORF, supra note 14, at 152.
19 Midwives were a special target for elimination by doctors. When high infant
mortality rates in turn-of-the-century New York were made public, doctors blamed
midwives. A 1910 national survey funded with Carnegie money recommended that a
campaign to drive midwives out of the maternity field be mounted. Efforts such as these
were successful in lowering the number of midwife-attended births in New York City
from two-fifths of all births in 1900 to one-tenth by 1932. This phenomenon was by no
means limited to New York. Midwife deliveries across the country dropped from 50%
in 1900 to 12% in 1936. See M. EDWARDS & M. WALDORF, supra note 14, at 153.
20 See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text; B. ROTHMAN, supra note 9, at
33-40.
2 Lamaze's method of "childbirth without pain" involved a series of physical and
mental exercises designed to change a woman's perception of pain. The newly condi-
tioned reflexes developed by these exercises were to replace the signal of pain with the
signal of the work of producing a child, thereby carrying the woman through labor
awake and in control of her own body. See M. EDWARDS & M. WALDORF, supra note
14, at 42-48; B. ROTHMAN, supra note 9, at 30-31.
22 Twilight sleep is a state of semiconsciousness induced by drugs. It does not
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"help" their doctors with the delivery.23 Although movements like
Lamaze took a few steps away from the medical model, they were by
no means a revolution. Women about to give birth continued to be
strapped to tables with their legs in stirrups, and the technology of
childbirth grew more complex and was more routinely employed.2"
Spurred by increasing self-awareness,2 5 women responded to this
overabundance of technology by searching for a method of childbirth
that was less male-dominated and that treated birth as a natural pro-
cess.2" Midwives once more began to be an attractive choice as a birth
attendant; however, they were few in number and sometimes impossible
to engage because of unfavorable state licensing laws27 and fierce oppo-
sition from the medical profession.2" Both midwives and consumers had
eliminate pain but is supposed to separate the woman from the experience of birth so
that she will not remember the pain. See B. ROTHMAN, supra note 9, at 59. For a
history of the twilight sleep method, see M. SANDELOWSKI, PAIN, PLEASURE AND
AMERICAN CHILDBIRTH: FROM THE TWILIGHT SLEEP TO THE READ METHOD,
1914-1960, at 3-20 (1984).
22 See B. ROTHMAN, supra note 9, at 30-31.
24 The use of fetal monitoring, introduced into clinical obstetrics in 1969, is now
routine. It was used in 70% of all births in 1978. See 1 S. PEGALIS & H. WACHSMAN,
AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 4:26, at 366 (1980). There are three
methods of fetal monitoring: externally by ultrasound monitoring of the fetal heart rate
and uterine contractions; internally by a fetal electrocardiogram that is obtained by
attaching electrodes to the baby's head and by uterine monitoring using a catheter
passed into the uterus through the cervix; and internally by direct sampling of fetal
blood, which is obtained by screwing an electrode into the baby's head. See B. ROTH-
MAN, supra note 9, at 45. All of these methods necessarily constrict the mother's move-
ment during the birth, thereby affecting the position she many assume and preventing
her from walking or squatting if that is more comfortable. Moreover, both internal
methods require artificial rupture of the amniotic membrane. In addition, the increased
use of fetal monitoring is associated with a higher rate of caesarean section. See C.
Miller, supra note 11, at 104-05.
2 The women's health movement has caused the female patient to accept respon-
sibility for her own health and reject the often dominating relationship of the doctor
over the patient. See C. Miller, supra note 11, at 118-19.
28 See infra text accompanying notes 48-52.
27 In California, for instance, lay midwives still may not practice legally. There is
no state law providing for their licensing, and the California Supreme Court has held
that the practice of lay midwifery violates a provision of California law, currently set
forth at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2052 (West Supp. 1986), that prohibits the unli-
censed practice of medicine. See Bowland v. Municipal Court, 18 Cal. 3d 479, 556
P.2d 1081, 134 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1976); see also M. EDWARDS & M. WALDORF, supra
note 14, at 164-79 (catalogue of midwife arrests in California from 1974 to 1982);
Caldwell, Bowland v. Municipal Court Revisited: A Defense Perspective on Unlicensed
Midwife Practice in California, 15 PAc. L.J. 19 (1983) (suggesting that Bowland be
reexamined in light of recent changes in California right-to-privacy law).
28 See, e.g., Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 549 F. Supp. 1185 (M.D. Tenn.
1982) (refusing to grant defendants' motion to dismiss an antitrust suit brought by two
nurse-midwives and their backup physician against a hospital for denying the midwives
staff privileges and against an insurance company owned and operated by doctors for
refusing to renew the malpractice insurance of the backup physician); Note, Hospital
Privileges for Nurse-Midwives: An Examination Under Anti-trust Law, 33 AM. U.L.
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to fight to make midwifery a viable option again.
B. The Legal Battles
Three main obstacles stood in the path of a midwifery revival:
first, the total absence of state licensing laws and the existene of hostile
laws inhibiting the practice of midwifery;" second, institutional obsta-
cles imposed by hospitals that refused to grant staff privileges to mid-
wives and by doctors who refused to provide the necessary backup ser-
vices;30 and third, the refusal of insurance companies to reimburse
policyholders for midwife services." Midwives have been fairly success-
ful in overcoming these problems.
Although some state laws'are more favorable than others, 2 nurse-
REv. 959 (1984) (examining the denial of hospital privileges to nurse-midwives under
antitrust law); deCourcy Hinds, Midwives Seek Delivery From Discrimination, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 7, 1983, § 4, at E9, col. 1 (discussing the barriers faced by midwives
seeking to operate independently of physicians).
29 See, e.g., supra note 27.
30 See Nurse-Midwifery Hearing, supra note 8, at 20-21 (testimony of Judy Nor-
sigian, Action Vice-Chair, National Women's Health Network) (discussing midwives
in Arkansas who were unable to obtain a backup physician and midwives in Connecti-
cut who were refused hospital privileges); id. at 35-45 (testimony of William Martin,
M.D.) (describing events leading up to the litigation in Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v.
Hibbett, 549 F. Supp. 1185 (M.D. Tenn. 1982)); id. at 55-59 (testimony of Lonnie
Morris, C.N.M., M.S., Childbirth Center, Englewood, N.J.) (describing physician re-
sistance in New Jersey, where the board of medical examiners, encouraged by local
physicians, attempted to promulgate extremely restrictive regulations governing
midwives).
S" Direct insurance reimbursement, in which either the nurse-midwife is paid di-
rectly by the insurer or the patient is reimbursed for the cost of midwife services, is an
important issue for midwives because it is a means to economic independence from
physicians and can affect whether a patient will go to a midwife at all. See Cohn,
Survey of Legislation on Third Party Reimbursement for Nurses, 11 LAW, MED. &
HEALTH CARE 260, 260-63 (1983).
3' For example, in Idaho the relationship between the nurse-midwife and her
backup physician is monitored in detail. The midwife must submit a description of the
scope of her practice and a copy of her agreement with the "supervising" physician.
There must be regularly- scheduled conferences between the physician and the midwife
as well. Perhaps as a result of this restrictive supervision, there were fewer than 10
nurse-midwives practicing in Idaho as of November 1983. See Cohn, Cudding, Kraus
& Tom, Legislation and Nurse-Midwifery Practice in the USA: Report on a 1983
Survey Conducted by the Political and Economic Affairs Committee of the American
College of Nurse Midwives, 29 J. NURsE-MIDWIFERY 55, 87 (1984). In contrast, as
the result of a court decision, nurse-midwives in Missouri can practice without direct
physician supervision. See Sermchief v. Gonzales, 660 S.W.2d 683, 689-90 (Mo. 1983)
(holding that services routinely provided by nurses and done pursuant to written proto-
cols signed by a physician were within the "profession of nursing" standard provided
by statute and did not constitute the unlawful practice of medicine).
The vehicle through which a state supervises midwives can be either hostile or
favorable. For example, North Carolina regulates midwives through a midwifery com-
mittee that has representatives of midwives as well as physicians and administrators.
See Cohn, Cudding, Kraus & Tom, supra, at 129. This gives midwives some control
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midwifery practice is now legal in almost every state."8 The status of
lay midwives is less certain, but they are able to practice legally in
some states.34 Midwives have strongly advocated favorable licensing
laws and view such laws as a way of establishing midwifery as an inde-
pendent profession.
3 5
Nurse-midwives have slowly gained the cooperation of the medical
profession,3 6 but relations between the two groups are far from smooth.
Many obstetricians see midwives as an economic threat to their prac-
over their own profession rather than placing them under the sole supervision of the
state medical board, whose members may have a bias toward physicians. The situation
in Ohio is a good example of the effect that such medical board supervision can have.
The procedure for receiving authorization to practice as a midwife in Ohio, though
described fairly simply in the authorizing statute itself, has become complex, and it may
take several months to complete. See id. at 133; see also Comment, Senate Bill 204:
Back to Basics in "Birthing," 14 CAP. U.L. REv. 103, 110-11 (1984) (stating that an
Ohio statute that does not expressly grant or deny hospital privileges to midwives has
allowed hospital boards to conclude that midwives were not granted these privileges);
Comment, A Matter of the Quality of Birth: Mothers and Midwives Shackled by the
Medical Establishment and Pennsylvania Law, 23 DuQ. L. REv. 171, 189-90 (1984)
(stating that Pennsylvania law on the practice of midwifery-which limits practice to
those properly certified in accordance with the regulations promulgated by the State
Board of Medical Education and Licensure, a body primarily composed of physi-
cians-has reduced the number of practicing midwives).
11 See Cohn, Cudding, Kraus & Tom, supra note 32, at 55-174 (listing the legal
status of nurse-midwives in every U.S. jurisdiction). The states of Nebraska and North
Dakota, however, still do not provide clear statutory authority for nurse-midwife prac-
tice. See id. at 60.
" Unlike the California courts, the Texas courts have separated midwifery from
the practice of medicine. According to the Texas courts, lay midwifery does not consti-
tute the illegal practice of medicine, and therefore lay midwives are free to assist births
despite the absence of a specific authorizing statute. See Banti v. State, 163 Tex. Crim.
89, 289 S.W.2d 244 (1956); see also R. DEVRiEs, REGULATING BIRTH: MinwivEs,
MEDICINE & THE LAW 61-70 (1985) (survey of recent legislative attempts in Texas to
regulate the practice of lay midwifery).
Lay midwives may practice legally in Arizona, but they must fulfill certain educa-
tional and practice requirements and pass a qualifying exam. See id. at 55-61; see also
Weitz & Sullivan, Licensed Lay Midwifery in Arizona, 29 J. NURsE-MIDWIFERY 21,
22 (1984) (State regulations require that lay midwives undertake certain training and
pass written, oral, and clinical examinations with a minimum score of 80% correct.).
85 See Rothman, Childbirth Management and Medical Monopoly: Midwifery as
(almost) a Profession, 29 J. NURSE-MIDWIFERY 300, 306 (1984) (stating that a profes-
sion has ultimate control over its work and the knowledge associated with it, and that
professional status comes from political action). But see R. DEVRiES, supra note 34, at
116-17. DeVries argues that licensing has forced midwives who practice legally to do so
under more restrictions than midwives practicing illegally, where patient and midwife
are "co-conspirators" and have the freedom of not being bound by external rules.
Nonetheless, DeVries recognizes that midwives practicing illegally pay a price for this
freedom, including fear of being sued, inability to advertise, and inability to accompany
their patients to the hospital.
" Nurse-midwives are viewed more favorably than lay midwives by the medical
profession "because they are drawn from the ranks of nurses, an ancillary medical
occupation." R. DEVRIFS, supra note 34, at 115. Lay midwives enjoy no such recogni-
tion from doctors. See id. at 60, 115-16.
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tices and do all in their power to impede the practice of midwifery.3 7
Hostility between midwives and physicians has existed throughout his-
tory; 8 although there has been some reconciliation, midwives will
likely have to continue to fight at least some physicians to retain their
current status.
The successful battle to obtain insurance reimbursement for mid-
wife services has been a major factor in allowing midwives to establish
practices outside of hospitals and independent of doctors. Midwives do
not practice with complete independence; they always have a backup
physician for emergencies and send any women whose pregnancy may
be complicated to a doctor. 9 Nonetheless, before reimbursement was
possible they could not get paid without the cooperation of their backup
physicians and therefore could not engage in an economically indepen-
dent practice.
40
Several states have recently passed laws mandating reimbursement
for midwife services. 41 The federal government provides reimbursement
3 See Nurse-Midwifery Hearing, supra note 8, at 72-76 (testimony of Ruth
Lubic, C.N.M.) (describing the obstacles that the local medical profession placed in the
path of establishing a free-standing birth center in New York City); id. at 164 (state-
ment of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists) (describing the call
for alternative health care in the field as "an attempt to re-order the practice of
medicine . . . increasing the risk to the patient by permitting less than adequately
trained individuals to independently manage and direct . . . care").
"8 See supra notes 15-28 and accompanying text.
39 See Spending Reduction Hearings, supra note 11, at 340 (testimony of Sally
Tom, C.N.M., Government Liaison, ACNM) ("Nurse-midwives screen carefully for
indications of medical problems and collaborate closely with physicians when complica-
tions arise, thus identifying clients who are essentially medically normal . . .");
ACNM & American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Joint Statement of
Practice Relationships Between Obstetricians/Gynecologists and Certified Nurse-Mid-
wives (Nov. 1, 1982) [on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review]; K.
McHugh, supra note 3, at 3-4.
40 See Spending Reduction Hearings, supra note 11, at 346-47 (testimony of
Sally Tom, C.N.M., Government Liaison, ACNM) (stating that nurse-midwives will
always collaborate closely with physicians but that the employment relationship be-
tween a midwife and her backup physician cannot remain that of an employee and her
employer if midwives are ever to become economically independent).
41 Sixteen states now provide for direct reimbursement by insurers for the services
of nurses, and hence, for the services of nurse-midwives. See ALASKA STAT.
§ 21.42.355 (Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38-174v (West Supp. 1985);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, § 354N (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62a.15(3a) (West
Supp. 1985); MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-41-213 (Supp. 1984) (reimbursement for services
of a "duly certified nurse practitioner working under the supervision of a duly licensed
physician"); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-22-111 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:26-40
(West 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-47-28.1 (Supp. 1985); N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 3216(10)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1985); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3923.23.3 (Page
Supp. 1984); OR. REv. STAT. § 743.128 (Supp, 1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40,
§ 3002 (Purdon Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 58-17-54 (Supp. 1985);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-33-2(4) (Supp. 1985) (not specifically mentioning nurse-mid-
wives but ensuring reimbursement for any "practitioner of the healing arts"); WASH.
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through Medicaid 42 and the Civilian Health and Medical Program of
the Uniformed Services (CHAMPUS). 43 These developments have
gone a long way in allowing midwives a measure of independence not
previously possible.
II. THE BENEFITS OF A STRONG PROFESSION OF MIDWIFERY
There are two main reasons why the presence of a strong profes-
sion of midwifery is desirable. First, midwifery affords a choice to
women seeking an alternative to the medical model of birth. Second,
midwives provide services for the poor who might otherwise be forced
to go without prenatal and intrapartum care.
A. The Psychology of Midwifery
There are considerable differences between the medical model of
birth and the model endorsed by midwives. The medical profession
tends to characterize the normal birth process as pathological and,
therefore, as requiring medical intervention.44 The medical profession
thus refers to the birth process as delivery by doctors rather than the
giving of birth by mothers,45 and routinely relies on elements alien to
the natural birth process, such as drugs, episiotomies, 46 fetal monitor-
ing, and caesarean sections.1
7
REv. CODE ANN. § 48.44.290 (West 1984); W. VA. CODE § 33-15-4b (Supp. 1985).
41 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(17) (1982).
43 10 U.S.C.A. § 1079(a)(13) (West Supp. 1985) (permitting reimbursement for
midwife services utilized by dependents of members of the uniformed services).
44 See W. ARNEY, supra note 14, at 42-45. Arney argues that obstetricians cre-
ated a pathological theory of pregnancy in order to establish dominance over the mid-
wifery profession. By convincing women that pregnancy was a "disease," they could
put themselves forth as the only sound way to affect a "cure." Id.; see also B. ROTH-
MAN, supra note 9, at 23-24, 33-41. Rothman describes the medical model as one in
which "the body is seen as a machine, and the male body is taken as the norm. Preg-
nancy and birth are at best complications . . . [and at] worst . . . diseaselike states."
Id. at 24.
4 See B. ROTHMAN, supra note 9, at 61-62.
48 An episiotomy is a surgical incision into the perineum and vagina for obstetrical
purposes. DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 454 (26th ed. 1981). Al-
though many physicians prefer the clean cut of the episiotomy to the jagged tear that
may be caused by the baby's head as it emerges, much of this tearing occurs because of
the insistence of these physicians on using the American style of delivery. B. RoTH-
MAN, supra note 9, at 58. A supine position, with the legs in stirrups, is not the posi-
tion most conducive to birth without tearing. See id.; see also Formato, Routine Pro-
phylactic Episiotomy: Is It Always Necessary?, 30 J. NURSE-MIDWIFERY 144, 145-46
(1985).
47 Fetal monitoring was used in 70% of all births in 1978. See 1 S. PEGALIS & H.
WACHSMAN, supra note 24, § 4.26, at 366. The use of fetal monitoring is often associ-
ated with higher caesarean section rates. See C. Miller, supra note 11, at 104-05. The
caesarean rate in the United States tripled between 1971 and 1981 and now approaches
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In contrast, the midwife views birth as a natural process and her
role as merely an attendant, present to assist the mother as she gives
birth to the baby.4 Resort to drugs, modern technology, and other in-
terventionist techniques for normal deliveries is much rarer among mid-
wives than it is among their medical counterparts. 9 Midwives believe
in assisting the birth process through natural means, and for the most
part they allow nature to take its course. 0 They view birth as a family
event, and many encourage a woman to have her family and friends
with her during the birth.51 Because of their perspective, midwives pro-
vide a quality of care in terms of nurturing and psychological support
that is often lacking in the typical doctor-patient relationship.5
Of course, midwives are not the right choice for all women. They
provide proper care only for "low risk" women: those whose medical
history and present condition suggest that there will be no complica-
tions during the pregnancy or birth.5 Women who have such complica-
20% of all deliveries nationwide. See id. at 98, 102; Defensive Medicine Hearing,
supra note 7, at 234-36 (statement of Esther Zorn, Founder/President, Cesarean Pre-
vention Movement, Inc.).
48 See B. ROTHMAN, supra note 9, at 179-81. "[Midwives] believe[ ] that
women's bodies are meant to bear children . . . [and] when . . . [they] do . . . [they]
are no more 'stressing' the system than . . . when . . . [they] are digesting a nutri-
tious meal." Id. at 24; see also Beal, Nurse-Midwife Intrapartum Management, 29 J.
NURsE-MIDWIFERY 13, 13 (1984) (stating that nurse-midwives view birth as a normal
process).
41 See Beal, supra note 48, at 15-17 (concluding, based on a study of medical
charts for maternity care at a clinic, that births attended by nurse-midwives entailed a
more selective use of IV's, fetal monitoring, pain medication, and anesthesia than phy-
sician-attended births). Whereas physicians will be quick to induce late or prolonged
labor through the use of drugs or by rupturing membranes artificially, midwives see
these two procedures as potentially dangerous. They will more often suggest techniques
such as nipple stimulation, sexual intercourse in a comfortable position, or castor oil.
See B. ROTHMAN, supra note 9, at 257-58; Davis, The Use of Castor Oil to Stimulate
Labor in Patients with Premature Rupture of Membranes, 29 J. NURSE-MIDWIFERY
366 (1984).
" The reader should keep in mind that it is only with respect to normal births
that midwives oppose the use of drugs and sophisticated technology. They have no
dispute with their use in pregnancies that are complicated by other conditions.
"' For a description of a home birth and the atmosphere that midwives encourage,
see Nurse-Midwifeiry Hearing, supra note 8, at 64-69 (statement of Marion McCart-
ney, R.N., C.N.M., Maternity Associates of Bethesda, Md.); B. ROTHMAN, supra note
9, at 287-92.
5' Some commentators suggest that this deficiency in the doctor-patient relation-
ship is one cause of the increase in malpractice suits. See REPORT OF THE NEW YORK
SPECIAL ADVISORY PANEL ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 86 (1976) [hereinafter cited
as NEW YORK REPORT]; J. KING, THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 322-23
(1977); Perlis & Brucker, Malpractice: A Professional Risk, J. NURSE-MIDWIFERY,
Mar.-Apr. 1983, at 3, 3.
53 "Nurse-midwifery practice is the independent management of care of essen-
tially normal newborns and women, antepartally, intrapartally, postpartally and/or
gynecologically." Nurse-Midwifery Hearing, supra note 8, at 7 (testimony of Sally
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tions are referred to doctors. 54
B. Economics
Midwives are not only a desirable alternative for those women
who can afford traditional medical services but choose the philosophy
and experience of a midwife-attended birth, but also a necessity for
many poor women who may receive no prenatal or intrapartum care if
midwifery services are not available.55 The infant mortality rate of chil-
dren born into low-income families remains considerably higher than
that of other children.5" One of the major causes of this gap is the high
incidence of low-birth-weight babies in the low-income population.
57
Proper prenatal care can dramatically decrease the number of low-
birth-weight babies.58 Midwives can provide this care very effectively.
Several studies and experimental programs have demonstrated the
positive effect of introducing midwife care in poor, high-risk popula-
tions.59 Midwives provide extensive prenatal care, in which they con-
centrate on proper nutrition and instruct women on how to care for
themselves during pregnancy.60 Of course, physicians provide excellent
prenatal care as well, but their high fees and traditional unwillingness
to work in low-income areas make them less available than midwives,
Tom, C.N.M., Government Liaison, ACNM).
" See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
5 See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
56 Statistics show that black infants born into low-income families are twice as
likely to die before their first birthday as are white infants born into higher-income
families. See Infant Mortality Rates: Failure to Close the Black-White Gap: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations and the Subcomm. on Health
and the Environment of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 15 (1984) (testimony of Rep. Julian Dixon) [hereinafter cited as Infant Mortality
Rate Hearing].
57 Id. at 33-35 (Two-thirds of all infant mortality is related to the problem of low
birth weight.) (testimony of Jeffrey Taylor, Ph.D., Chief, Division of Maternal and
Child Health, Michigan Dep't of Public Health).
58 Id. at 346-48 (testimony of Sally Tom, C.N.M., Government Liaison,
ACNM). For example, a study conducted at the Medical University of South Carolina
found a birth rate of 9.1% for those receiving prenatal care as compared with a rate of
12.7% for those not receiving such care. Id. at 347. Furthermore, women who liked
their care-provider expressed more satisfaction with their care and were more likely to
keep prenatal appointments. Id. at 346-47.
11 See Spending Reduction Hearings, supra note 11, at 340-42 (testimony of
Sally Tom, C.N.M., Government Liaison, ACNM). For example, in the 18 months
following the introduction of a pilot nurse-midwifery project in Madera County, Cali-
fornia, the prematurity rate dropped from 11% to 6.6%; in Holmes County, Missis-
sippi, infant mortality rates dropped from approximately 39 per 1000 live births to 20
per 1000 in the two years following the introduction of nurse-midwife services. Id. at
341.
10 See Infant Mortality Rate Hearing, supra note 56, at 346-48 (testimony of
Sally Tom, C.N.M., Government Liaison, ACNM).
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whose fees and operating costs are lower and who historically have
been willing to work with the poor."1
Midwives' relatively low-cost services also have a beneficial effect
on health care costs as a whole. Since midwife-attended births often
involve little or no time in the hospital, less expensive technology dur-
ing the birth, and lower fees for professional services, they lessen the
cost of birth not only for the consumer, but for members of group in-
surance plans and for the taxpayer as well.6 2 The benefit to a society
increasingly concerned with the mounting cost of its health care system
is obvious. The federal government has recognized the social and eco-
nomic benefits of midwives and has passed laws acknowledging these
advantages.6 3
C. Safety
A skeptic may think that midwives should not be trusted with the
important task of bringing mothers and babies through the birth pro-
cess successfully; this conclusion, however, would be wrong. Midwives
have been closely monitored, mainly in an effort to discredit them, and
studies show that a midwife-attended birth is as safe as one attended by
a physician .
4
1 " 'The real loss . . . is that nurse-midwives across the country are largely car-
ing for the poor. Obstetricians won't be picking up the care of those patients.'" Law-
son, supra note 1, at C3, col. 2 (quoting Edith Wonnell, Director, Birthing Center of
Delaware); see also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
62 Midwives typically earn salaries of $20,000 to $25,000 per year, and the cost of
giving birth in a birthing center is about $1,500. The same hospital care costs approxi-
mately $3,000. See Quarembo, supra note 2, at 62, col. 1. Moreover, since midwives
utilize drugs and expensive medical technology less often, they save society the cost of
the equipment and the personnel needed to administer them. See Beal, supra note 48,
at 17. The taxpayer also benefits from the lower cost of midwifery care. Statistics from
1980 show that Medicaid paid from $1,649.53 to $2,230.04 for normal maternity care
with a three-day hospital stay. These figures were approximately $700 to $1,200 more
than the $1,000 cost incurred at a birthing center staffed by nurse-midwives. See
Nurse-Midwifery Hearing, supra note 8, at 75 (testimony of Ruth Lubic, C.N.M.).
"s Along with reimbursement under Medicaid and CHAMPUS, see supra notes
42-43 and accompanying text, the federal government also encourages nurse-midwifery
through grants for training programs. See 42 U.S.C. § 297 (1982). Several federal
agencies, including the Indian Health Service and the National Health Service Corps,
rely heavily on nurse-midwives to provide care in their programs. See Spending Reduc-
tion Hearings, supra note 11, at 339 (statement of the ACNM).
" See Nurse-Midwifery Hearing, supra note 8, at 147 (testimony of Judith
Rooks, C.N.M., M.S., M.P.H., former consultant, Office of Population Affairs, Dep't
of Health and Human Services) (stating that there are between 30 and 50 published
studies about the safety of births attended by nurse-midwives and that "[a]lthough each
of these studies is imperfect and inadequate by itself, they accumulate to show a clear
trend. In every case, nurse-midwifery service outcomes have been as good, if not better,
than what they replaced.").
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It must be remembered that midwives serve only low-risk women
who have been carefully screened. 5 Many midwife-attended births,
moreover, occur in a non-hospital setting-the woman's home or a
birth center. Moving the birth away from the hospital setting, particu-
larly to the home, greatly decreases the risk of infection to both mother
and child.66
The tendency of midwives to avoid excessive use of medical tech-
nology and drugs adds to their safety record.67 Use of unnecessary
drugs during birth endangers both mother and child." The routine use
of fetal monitoring for normal births, which is associated with an in-
crease in the caesarean rate, adds to the risks associated with hospital
births.69 Unless a birth involves medical complications, it is safer to give
birth naturally than to undergo unnecessarily the risks of anesthesia
and infection that accompany any caesarean section.
7 0
Finally, the attitude toward birth taken by midwives adds to the
psychological health of both mother and child. The hospital practice of
separating mother and infant immediately following birth disrupts the
85 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
66 In one study comparing home and hospital births of women matched for age,
parity (prior birth experience), socioeconomic status, and risk factors, four times as
many babies born in the hospital became infected. See B. ROTHMAN, supra note 9, at
43-44.
87 Physicians have been accused of employing drugs and medical technology rou-
tinely in normal births. The medical profession has become so dependent on the fruits
of its own scientific advancement that it tends to use these devices not because they are
medically necessary but because they are part of standard procedure. See supra notes
44-47 and accompanying text; see also Nurse-Midwifery Hearing, supra note 8, at 91-
112 (testimony of C. Arden Miller, M.D., Chair., Dep't of Maternal and Child
Health, University of North Carolina) (arguing that much of this technology has been
scrutinized and tested less rigorously than midwives have been).
" See, e.g., Haire, Effect of Drugs: How the FDA Determines the Safety of Drugs,
J. NURSE-MIDWIFERY, Mar.-Apr. 1982, at 28. Haire notes that a drug continually or
frequently administered to the mother during labor can accumulate in the baby's blood
and be trapped there when the umbilical cord is cut. See id. at 30.
'0 Women who undergo a caesarean section have a higher mortality rate than
those who give birth vaginally. See Nurse-Midwifery Hearing, supra note 8, at 92
(testimony of C. Arden Miller, M.D., Chair., Dep't of Maternal and Child Health,
University of North Carolina). Critics have suggested that the caesarean rate in this
country is considerably higher than it would be if only medically necessary caesareans
were performed. The national rate currently approaches 20%. If only medically neces-
sary caesareans were performed, the rate would be closer to 5%. See Defensive
Medicine Hearing, supra note 7, at 234 (statement of Esther Zorn, Founder/Presi-
dent, Cesarean Prevention Movement, Inc.); see also Nurse-Midwifery Hearing, supra
note 8, at 91-93 (testimony of C. Arden Miller, M.D., Chair., Dep't of Maternal and
Child Health, University of North Carolina).
"o Fifty percent of women who have caesarean sections are given deep anesthesia
and 10% receive blood transfusions. Both of these procedures carry risks. See Nurse-
Midwfery Hearing, supra note 8, at 92 (testimony of C. Arden Miller, M.D., Chair.,
Dep't of Maternal and Child Health, University of North Carolina).
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natural bonding process so important to both of them.71 In contrast,
mother and child are kept together after most midwife-attended
births."2
Midwives are therefore a desirable alternative to the services of-
fered by the medical profession. If they are to continue practicing, how-
ever, a solution must be found to the malpractice insurance crisis they
are currently facing.
III. THE MALPRACTICE CRISIS
A. The General Problem
The problem of obtaining affordable malpractice insurance is
neither new73 nor confined to midwives. 4 Nevertheless, it is somewhat
ironic that midwives have become one of the hardest-hit victims of the
insurance crunch, because proportionately they are sued far less often
than physicians. Six percent of the country's midwives have been
named in malpractice suits, while sixty percent of obstetricians have
been sued for malpractice. 5
71 See B. ROTHMAN, supra note 9, at 182-84. Rothman notes that medicine has
separated the mother from her infant both physically and conceptually. This separation
is reflected in the existence of specialties in obstetrics, pediatrics, and neonatology. Id.
at 182.
7 Midwives believe that it is important for the mother and child to get to know
each other as soon as possible after birth. Many encourage the woman to hold her baby
and to use the "feel" of it to develop an instinct for its needs. Other midwives will
advise the mother to keep the baby in bed with her for the first few days after birth;
they feel that both the mother and the baby will be more content and better able to rest.
Id. at 183-84.
73 A similar "crisis" occurred in the mid-seventies. Many doctors found them-
selves without insurance altogether, and many went on strike to protest the situation.
See Defensive Medicine Hearing, supra note 7, at 29-30 (statement of Arnold J. Ros-
off, J.D., Associate Professor, Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylva-
nia); Montgomery, Doctors Planning Treatment Curbs in Insurance Fight, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 28, 1975, at Al, col. 4.
74 Insurance problems have affected the entire medical profession, see supra note
7, as well as other industries and professions. See, e.g., Fish, N.J. Fisherman Consider
Forming an Insurance Co-op, Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 7, 1985, at 11-D, col. I
(commercial fishermen); Fish, On Thin Ice Without Insurance, Philadelphia Inquirer,
Nov. 3, 1985, at H1, col. I (ice skating rinks); Sugaward, "Hysteria" in Day-Care
Crisis Cited, Washington Post, July 31, 1985, at B2, col. 1 (day-care centers); Broder,
Insurance Liability is at a Premium, L.A. Times, July 14, 1985, § V, at 1, ol. 6
(liability insurance for corporate officers and directors).
The entire property and casualty insurance industry has suffered considerable
losses as a result of this problem. See Keppel, Liability Insurers are Fleeing Field in
Wake of Big Damage Awards, L.A. Times, June 17, 1985, § IV, at 1, col. 5; 1984
Seen as Worst Year Ever: Losses Outpaced Investment Income, Nat'l Underwriter,
Jan. 11, 1985, at 1, col. 2.
7' See Kolbert, supra note 2. Despite these statistics, insurers justify the increased
rates by reference to the increase in the number of malpractice suits and high jury
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There are several factors that may account for this difference. The
relationship between a midwife and her client is normally very close.
The woman and her midwife work together to bring about a successful
birth and thereby develop a relationship that is different from the aver-
age doctor-patient relationship. Thus, the breakdown of the doctor-pa-
tient relationship that many commentators cite as contributing to the
rise in malpractice suits7" is not a factor in the midwife context.
That midwives work only with low-risk women7" also contributes
to the low percentage of suits brought against them. It is highly proba-
ble that a woman attended by a midwife will have an uneventful preg-
nancy and birth and, therefore, will have no reason to sue. Moreover,
the cautious attitude of midwives toward the potential overuse of medi-
cal technology and drugs78 lessens the likelihood of suit against them.
Regardless of the reasons why midwives should not be affected by
the crisis, the fact is that the present insurance crisis is a particular
hardship for them. Today's problem is one of affordability rather than
availability. Because doctor-owned insurance companies and joint un-
derwriting associations were formed in response to a 1970's insurance
crisis,7 19 most doctors can now obtain malpractice insurance, albeit at an
extremely high cost." For midwives, however, the crisis of affordability
means that insurance is simply not available. Midwives do not earn the
large salaries of doctors, and it is more difficult for them to pass the
increased cost of insurance on to their clients."1 Therefore, merely mak-
ing insurance available will not ease the crisis facing midwives.
Efforts to insure midwives through joint underwriting associations
awards. They also question the concept of a low-risk birth. One insurer asked, "'How
do you know it's a low-risk birth until after it's over?"' Id. (quoting Philip Bies,
President, Medical Malpractice Insurance Association).
7 See supra note 52.
77 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
71 See supra notes 49-50, 67 and accompanying text.
79 More than 20 states authorized the creation of joint underwriting associations
in 1975. See A LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ISSUE 4-5 (D.
Warren & R. Merrit eds. 1976) [hereinafter cited as A LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE]. The
concept behind these associations was to force insurers to provide malpractice coverage
by allowing them to share any resulting losses. A limited number of companies contin-
ued to provide malpractice coverage, but all companies had to share in any losses. In
return, the insurers retained the right to carry other, more lucrative types of liability
insurance. See id.
80 See Defensive Medicine Hearing, supra note 7, at 105-07 (statement of John
E. Rolig, Underwriting Officer, Medical Services Division, St. Paul Fire and Marine
Insurance Co.).
"1 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. Part of the attractiveness of the mid-
wife option is the affordability of midwives' services, particularly for low-income fami-
lies. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Forcing a midwife's clients to absorb
the cost of a high insurance premium would eliminate this advantage.
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have been unsuccessful because they have offered either excessive pre-
miums or an insufficient amount of coverage.8 2 To date, only one state,
New Jersey, has offered midwives insurance from a private carrier.8 3
Thus, the current state of the malpractice insurance market makes it
impossible for midwives to practice their profession.
Midwives face a special problem, and actions taken that may
lessen the crisis for doctors will not necessarily do the same for mid-
wives. The malpractice problem, moreover, is a particularly intractable
one, and a long-range solution does not appear imminent. Although a
detailed analysis of all of the causes, effects, and potential solutions is
beyond the scope of this Comment,"' it is necessary to set out a brief
history of the problem in order to demonstrate that a long-range solu-
tion is likely to be many years away.
B. Why So Many Malpractice Suits?
The malpractice crisis is characterized by an increase in the num-
ber of suits and the amount of awards. These increases have made in-
surers reluctant to underwrite malpractice insurance and have caused
those that do to charge increasingly higher premiums.
There is much disagreement as to the causes of the current prob-
lem. Doctors blame lawyers and the legal system;"5 in turn, lawyers
" See K. McHugh, supra note 3, at 8. Efforts are currently underway in Penn-
sylvania to insure midwives through that state's joint underwriting association, and it is
not yet known whether these efforts will be as unsuccessful as similar efforts in other
states have been. See Quarembo, supra note 2. For a brief discussion of joint under-
writing associations, see supra note 79.
8 See K. McHugh, supra note 3, at 8. The annual premium for this policy is
$1,709. See Kolbert, supra note 2, at A56, col. 1. In comparison, many obstetricians
pay more than $80,000 a year for insurance. See id.
"Much has been written on the subject of medical malpractice and the myriad
problems associated with it. See, e.g., S. LAw & S. POLAN, PAIN AND PROFIT: THE
POLITICS OF MALPRACTICE (1978) (presenting a comprehensive treatment of the mal-
practice problems from the perspectives of the medical, legal, and insurance systems,
addressing such issues as the contingency fee and no-fault alternatives); T. LOMBARDI,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: A LEGISLATOR'S VIEW (1978) (presenting an
overview of the malpractice problem and New York State's response to it); Learner,
Restrictive Medical Malpractice Compensation Schemes: A Constitutional "Quid Pro
Quo" Analysis to Safeguard Individual Liberties, 18 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 141 (1981)
(examining legislative responses to malpractice litigation, such as dollar recovery limita-
tion and arbitration procedures); Note, Comparative Approaches to Liability for Medi-
cal Maloccurrences, 84 YALE L.J. 1141 (1975) (advocating ways to achieve economic
efficiency and cost-cutting in health care and malpractice litigation).
85 See Defensive Medicine Hearing, supra note 7, at 165-66 (statement of Elvoy
Raines, Associate Director, Dep't of Professional Liability, American College of Obste-
tricians and Gynecologists) (criticizing large jury awards and their impact on physi-
cians); T. LOMBARDI, supra note 84, at 23-24 (noting, in part, that doctors believe
lawyers are building a malpractice practice to compensate for the reduction of suits due
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blame doctors and the insurance industry."8 Despite these conflicting
accusations, commentators suggest a number of possible causes of the
dramatic increase in malpractice suits. First, increasing specialization
and subspecialization in medicine have changed the basic doctor-patient
relationship.8 Doctors are no longer familiar friends, but strangers.
Second, as medical technology becomes more complicated, chance of
human error increases. 8 Further, even slight errors in judgment can
have major consequences for the patient in terms of pain and disability.
Finally, consumerism and somewhat unrealistic expectations about the
capacities of modern medicine have combined to make patients less
trusting and more willing to blame the doctor for an adverse outcome.89
The legislative response to the problem has generally been to pass
hastily drafted legislation aimed at alleviating the "crisis" with little
intensive study of its root causes.90 The existence of the present "crisis"
to no-fault insurance in other areas); Pabst, A Medical Opinion Survey of Physicians'
Attitudes on Medical Malpractice, in HEW REPORT, supra note 7, at 83, 84 (stating
that 30% of the doctors who were sued claimed that aggressive lawyers are "the single
most common cause of malpractice suits today"); Malcolm, Doctors Prepare Attack on
Suits for Malpractice, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1985, at Al, col. 2.
s" See Gesler, Aiken, Gleisner, Domnitz & Antoine, Medical Malpractice: Elimi-
nating the Myths, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 259, 263 (1985) (The cause of the "crisis" is
"the failure of the Medical Society and the insurance industry to identify, discipline,
and remove from the profession those health care providers who through their negli-
gence cause untold suffering and injury to an unsuspecting public.") (footnote omitted);
Keene, California's Medical Malpractice Crisis, in A LEGISLATOR'S GUIDE, supra
note 79, at 27, 28 ("[T]he legal societies in California . . . have been very adamant in
their position that the cause of the current crisis has been the unrestricted investment
policies of insurance companies accompanied by rampant medical malpractice by physi-
cians."); Londrigan, The Medical Malpractice "Crisis," TRIAL, May 1985, at 22, 24
(arguing that the insurance industry's exemption from the antitrust laws and the indus-
try's freedom from effective rate regulation caused the dramatic rise in medical mal-
practice rates).
Insurers have not been above defending themselves and casting a few accusations
of their own. See Brostoff, Blasts Lawyer Charge That Industry Is Creating A Mal-
practice Crisis, Nat'l Underwriter, Apr. 19, 1985, at 1. col. 2 (noting that "less than
three percent of all companies are offering [malpractice insurance]" and that "trial
lawyers [are] using 'smoke and mirrors' to advance their own narrow self-interest").
s7 Doctors are now perceived to be impersonal and inconsiderate, unlike the tradi-
tional small-town physician with his little black bag. See Mechanic, Some Social As-
pects of the Medical Malpractice Dilemma, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1179, 1184; see also
supra note 52 and accompanying text.
8 See Mechanic, supra note 87, at 1181-82.
8 See NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 52, at 9-10; see also Defensive Medicine
Hearing, supra note 7, at 174 (statement of John R. Ball, Associate Executive Vice
President for Health and Public Policy, American College of Physicians) ("Patients
have come to expect that complex machinery, sophisticated hospitals, and super-special-
ized personnel should produce improved health outcomes. When they do not, and espe-
cially when they produce an adverse result, the patient is apt to feel aggrieved.").
90 See S. LAW & S. POLAN, supra note 84, at 207. Law and Polan suggest that
legislators were greatly influenced by physicians' threats and that they based their ac-
tions on "woefully inadequate data and misconceptions of legal doctrines . . . ... Id. at
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is proof that the rash of legislation passed in response to the last crisis
has not been successful.
C. Possible Solutions
1. Tort Reforms and Forum Shifting
State reforms previously attempted fall into two major categories:
tort reform and shifting the forum in which malpractice suits are
brought from the traditional courtroom setting to a less adversarial ar-
bitration proceeding or screening panel. Both of these efforts have run
into problems in the courts, and neither has had the desired effect of
reducing the number of suits or the size of awards.
Tort reforms aimed at the medical malpractice problem include
limiting contingent fees, 91 shortening statutes of limitation,92 eliminat-
ing the ad damnum pleading,9" and placing ceilings on recovery.94 The
fairness of some of these measures has been questioned,9 5 and some
206.
91 See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West Supp. 1986) (adopting a
sliding scale in which the percentage of recovery allocated to the fee declines as the
amount recovered increases); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.138 (West Supp. 1985) (requir-
ing the trial court to determine the reasonableness of contingent fee arrangements).
92 See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 260, § 4 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1985)
(providing for a limitation of three years from the date on which the cause of action
accrues in the case of a minor, rather than the 20-year limitation on most causes of
action); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5805(4), 600.5838(2) (West Supp. 1985)
(providing for a two-year statute of limitations with a six-month extension from the
time of discovery if the plaintiff can prove that she should not have discovered the
injury earlier); N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAW § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1985) (providing
that a medical malpractice cause of action accrues in two years and six months from the
date of discovery, rather than in three years, the period applicable to other malpractice
actions).
,3 The ad damnum pleading permitted or required the plaintiff to set forth in her
complaint the amount of money she was seeking. For statutes abolishing this require-
ment, see, for example, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.042(1) (West Supp. 1985) (abolishing
pleading of the amount of general damages but permitting pleading of the amount of
special damages); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-1-6 (West Supp. 1985) (stating that "no
dollar amount or figure shall be included in the demand in any malpractice complaint,
but the prayer shall be for such damages as are reasonable in the premises").
' See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.42(B)(2) (West Supp. 1986) (A
qualified health care provider is not liable for more than $100,000 per patient.); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 655.23(5) (West 1980) (A qualified health care provider is liable for
"cno more than $200,000 per claim and $600,000 per year or the maximum liability
limit for which the provider is insured, whichever is higher."); see also Comment, Med-
ical Malpractice: A Sojourn Through the Jurisprudence Addressing Limitation of Li-
ability, 30 Loy. L. REv. 119 (1984) (analyzing the constitutionality of Louisiana's
limitation-on-liability provision). For a survey of state reforms in general, see Com-
ment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis,
1975 DUKE L.J. 1417.
,5 See Defensive Medicine Hearing, supra note 7, at 31-32 (statement of Arnold
J. Rosoff, J.D., Associate Professor, Wharton School of Business, University of Penn-
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state courts have found them unconstitutional. 6 Furthermore, in prac-
tice they have had little effect on the problem.9"
A number of states have tried changing the forum in which mal-
practice suits are brought in an attempt to reduce both the administra-
tive costs associated with bringing a malpractice suit and the amount of
awards.98 Many states have instituted various forms of arbitration pro-
ceedings or screening panels.9" For the most part, however, these re-
forms have not been effective. '00 In fact, the delays associated with the
arbitration and panel systems have led some state courts to find them
sylvania) ("[T]he solution to increased malpractice litigation is not simply to make it
harder for aggrieved patients to sue .... "); id. at 204-06 (statement of Thomas
Dendorf, Executive Director, Association of Trial Lawyers of America) (criticizing
laws that respond to the medical malpractice crisis by making it more difficult for
people to sue "when wronged"); Learner, supra note 84, at 147, 187-89 ("[Legislative]
efforts to alleviate the medical malpractice insurance crisis . . . have placed the brunt
of such reform on those least able to bear its burdens-future medical malpractice
victims.").
0 Courts in Illinois, New Hampshire, North Dakota, and Ohio have held uncon-
stitutional the imposition of monetary limitations on recoveries in medical malpractice
cases. See Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Il1. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736
(1976); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270
N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164,
355 N.E.2d 903 (Ct. C.P. Montgomery County 1976). But see Fein v. Permanente
Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 679-84, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368, 382-87 (1985) (en banc)
(upholding CAL. CIv. CODE § 3333.2(b) (West Supp. 1986), which limits
noneconomic damages in medical malpractice suits to $250,000).
11 See Defensive Medicine Hearing, supra note 7, at 28 (statement of Arnold J.
Rosoff, J.D., Associate Professor, Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsyl-
vania) ("Sadly, it is clear now, almost a decade later, that these various legislative fixes
have not been wholly effective."); S. LAW & S. POLAN, supra note 84, at 206 ("These
changes have little impact on the costs of malpractice insurance.").
" See Defensive Medicine Hearing, supra note 7, at 32 (statement of Arnold J.
Rosoff, J.D., Associate Professor, Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsyl-
vania) (stating that 86% of premiums paid for malpractice liability insurance go to
operate the claims resolution system rather than to pay compensation to injured pa-
tients); Comment, supra note 94, at 1463 (The advantages of alternative forums over
the jury trial are "speed, informality, and the use of a sophisticated decision-maker in a
matter of technical complexity.") (footnote omitted). It is argued that experts, under-
standing medical jargon and procedures, will be better able to evaluate a case on its
merits and will likely give lower awards than juries who may be deciding cases based
on sympathy rather than a clear understanding of the facts.
9 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-2602 to -2605 (Supp. 1983) (screening
panel); CAL. CIv. PROc. CODE § 1295(a)-(b) (West 1982) (allowing medical contracts
that include arbitration clauses); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-9.5-9-1 (West 1984) (screening
panel); OHiO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.21 (Page 1981) (arbitration panel); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 655.02 (West 1980) (arbitration panel).
100 See, e.g., MacAlister & Scanlan, Health Claims Arbitration in Maryland:
The Experiment Has Failed, 14 U. BALT. L. REv. 481 (1985) (stating that in Mary-
land the use of arbitration to resolve health claims has failed to reduce the number of
suits, size of awards, or delay in resolving claims). But see Daughtrey & Smith, Medi-
cal Malpractice Review Panels in Operation in Virginia, 19 U. RICH. L. REv. 273,
298 (1985) (stating that the panels seem to be working but that it may be too soon to
determine their constitutionality).
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unconstitutional. °1 Since forum shifting has not had the intended effect
of speeding up the process and reducing administrative costs, 02 such
reforms are not likely to reduce the cost of malpractice insurance.
2. No-Fault Proposals
Recognizing that tort reform and forum shifting are ineffective,
some commentators have advocated abandoning the present fault-based
tort system altogether and instituting a no-fault system modeled on au-
tomobile no-fault insurance.1 0 3
The central concept of the various no-fault proposals is that of
"iatrogenic injury": the patient is compensated for any injury caused by
medical treatment, whether or not negligence was involved. 04 Several
101 See, e.g., Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231, 236-27 (Fla. 1980) (holding that
arbitration procedures so extended the process of suing for malpractice that they effec-
tively denied access to the courts); Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 396, 421 A.2d
190, 196 (1980) (striking down a provision of Pennsylvania law that gave original,
exclusive jurisdiction over medical malpractice claims to arbitration panels, because de-
lays in processing claims under the arbitration system resulted in an impermissible
infringement on the right to a jury trial).
102 There is a compelling reason why the difficulty of arbitration-induced delay
exists: the constitutions of 48 states guarantee the right to jury trial. See Comment,
supra note 94, at 1466. These constitutional provisions make it difficult to require that
mandatory arbitration be the final, binding resolution of a malpractice conflict. As a
result, the arbitration procedure, rather than promoting efficiency and savings, has be-
come an added step in an already long and protracted type of litigation.
1103 See, e.g., NEw YORK REPORT, supra note 52, at 57-63, 129-37; Havighurst,
"Medical Adversity Insurance"-Has Its Time Come?, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1233; Havig-
hurst & Tancredi, "Medical Adversity Insurance"-A No-Fault Approach to Medical
Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 1974 INs. L.J. 69; O'Connell, Expanding No-
Fault Beyond Auto Insurance: Some Proposals, 59 VA. L. REv. 749 (1973).
104 More than one model of a no-fault system has been suggested. See, e.g., Hav-
ighurst, supra note 103, at 1254-63; Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 103, at 71
(contemplating a system using detailed lists of the adverse consequences of certain med-
ical procedures for which the patient would be compensated regardless of fault);
O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Liability by Contract-With or Without an Enabling
Statute, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 59, 62 (suggesting a system in which physicians elect to pay
on a no-fault basis for injuries they cause and in which coverage is limited to any class
of risks the doctors choose, while other injuries would remain subject to the traditional
tort system); see also O'Connell, Offers That Can't Be Refused: Foreclosure of Per-
sonal Injury Claims by Defendants' Prompt Tender of Claimants' Net Economic
Losses, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 589, 601 (1982) (proposing a statute that would give a
defendant "against any claim for personal injury the option of foreclosing such claim by
offering, within sixty days of the claim, to pay the claimant's net economic losses" not
covered by the claimants' collateral sources) (footnote omitted).
Richard Epstein, who does not subscribe to the no-fault approach, see Epstein,
Medical Malpractice: Its Cause and Cure, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MAL-
PRACTICE 245, 257-67 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Epstein, Cause
and Cure], suggests yet another approach to the problem. He proposes that the prob-
lem of personal injury in malpractice cases is one not for tort law, but for private
agreements between physicians, hospitals, and patients setting the terms on which med-
ical services are rendered. See Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case For Contract,
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failings of the tort system have prompted these proposals. The current
tort system is criticized for the high administrative costs and delay in-
volved in claims processing and fault finding,105 for the growth of de-
fensive medicine, 08 and for the fact that many patients who suffer inju-
ries due to medical treatment are not compensated under the present
system because the amount of damage they suffer does not make a suit
economically feasible.10 7 Many commentators, however, continue to
stress the deterrent effects of the current system and insist that a no-
fault system is too problematic and uncertain to succeed.108 Moreover,
several problems in applying a no-fault system to the field of medicine
make the ultimate success of such a system in stemming the high cost of
malpractice insurance highly unlikely.
The most difficult aspect of a no-fault system is defining a "com-
pensable" event. Although proponents claim that it is feasible to de-
velop lists of compensable events,'0 9 the inherent characteristics of med-
ical injury make it extremely difficult to do so." 0 In the automobile
1976 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 87. There are numerous problems with such a
proposal, the most pressing of which is the unequal bargaining power of a patient who
is in need of medical services.
105 In 1975 in New York, 250 million dollars in premiums were collected, and
only 25 to 40% of the premiums were eventually paid out to injured patients. See NEw
YORK REPORT, supra note 52, at 156. A study done in California in 1975 reported
that in premium years 1962 to 1972, 46% of fees were consumed by litigation, 20%
were spent on administrative costs, and, at most, 34% were received by plaintiffs as
direct compensation for injuries suffered. See Keene, supra note 86, at 29.
106 Defensive medicine is generally defined as the use of medical resources pri-
marily for the purpose of protecting the physician against a claim rather than for the
patient's well-being. The AMA Committee on Professional Liability estimated that the
total cost of defensive medicine in 1983 was $15.1 billion. See Defensive Medicine
Hearing, supra note 7, at 5 (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch).
107 Although many lawyers argue that the contingent fee system is invaluable be-
cause it allows those who would not otherwise be able to afford suits to bring them, it
also has the opposite effect: it discourages lawyers from taking cases in which the pros-
pects of success may be very good but the economic damage to the patient is small. See
S. LAW & S. POLAN, supra note 84, at 84-85.
211 See Defensive Medicine Hearing, supra note 7, at 6-7 (statement of Patricia
M. Danzon, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Economics, Duke University) (arguing that
the powerful deterrent effects of the current malpractice structure would be lost under a
no-fault system); id. at 42 (statement of Barry F. Furrow, Associate Professor of Law,
University of Detroit) ("[A]s a quality control device, [the tort system] has a great deal
of value."); S. LAw & S. PoLAN, supra note 84, at 155-56 (arguing that it would be
dangerous to abandon the current system in favor of a no-fault system because we
would lose the deterrent effect of existing tort law).
109 See ABA COMM'N ON MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABIrry, DESIGNATED
COMPENSABLE EvENT SYSTEm: A FEAsiBITrY STUDY 5 (1979); Havighurst, supra
note 103, at 1256-59; Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 103, at 75-76.
110 Several commentators suggest that the problem of defining a compensable
event in the medical context is nearly insurmountable. See, e.g., S. LAw & S. POLAN,
supra note 84, at 150 ("Defining what constitutes a compensable event is enormously
difficult."); Epstein, Cause and Cure, supra note 104, at 260-64.
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context, it is fairly easy to determine whether an injury results from use
of an automobile. In the medical context, where the patient often is ill
from the start, however, it is difficult to determine whether a particular
injury results from treatment or from the condition that brought the
patient to the physician in the first place. Because of this difficulty,
little savings in time or administrative costs would be realized under a
medical no-fault system."11 The need for litigation would not be elimi-
nated; rather, the focus of litigation would merely shift from whether
the physician has been negligent to whether the injury was related to
treatment.11 2
Even if an acceptable solution to the problem of defining a com-
pensable event were found, a no-fault system would likely be considera-
bly more expensive than the present system of malpractice liability in-
surance.1 3 A no-fault system compensates injured persons whom the
present system excludes. Although proponents of no-fault insurance
claim that savings in administrative costs, elimination of duplicate pay-
ments for injuries, and elimination of damages for non-economic inju-
ries 1 4 would offset the increase in the number of claims paid, there is
considerable evidence to the contrary.11 5 Experience with automobile
no-fault does not support the belief that the adoption of a no-fault sys-
tem would lead to a decrease in costs; 6 the difficulties in defining
"I See Note, supra note 84, at 1163 (concluding that "[a] dramatic savings in
administrative costs is less likely to materialize with medical care strict liability than
with strict liability in other tort areas, because of the difficulties in determining ia-
trogenicity [treatment-induced injuries]").
"' An analogous problem arises in the area of workers' compensation, for which a
whole body of case law has developed concerning whether a particular injury occurred
within the scope of employment. See, e.g., Morgan v. Industrial Comm'n, 89 Ill. 2d
502, 506, 433 N.E.2d 1305, 1306 (1982) (upholding a finding of the industrial com-
mission that the claimant failed to prove that his accident arose out of and in the course
of his employment); Oakes v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Rd., 79 Pa. Commw.
454, 460, 469 A.2d 723, 726 (1984) (holding that an electric company foreman who
was returning from work at the site of a power outage was acting "in the course of his
employment" at the time of his fatal accident).
11 See S. LAW & S. POLAN, supra note 84, at 152-54; see also T. LOMBARDI,
supra note 84, at 136 (predicting that the adoption of a no-fault system "could be
catastrophic in terms of health care costs").
14 See Havighurst, supra note 103, at 1270-72.
115 See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text; see also Keeton, Compensa-
tion for Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 590, 616 (1973) (concluding that "a
shift from fault to nonfault . . . in the medical accident field, rather than leading to
improved efficiency and lower overall costs, would lead to only slight improvement in
efficiency and to substantially higher overall costs").
116 See T. LOMBARDI, supra note 84, at 136; S. LAW & S. POLAN, supra note 84,
at 152; see also Maroney, No-Fault Automobile Insurance: A Success or Failure After
Eleven Years?, 51 INS. COUNSEL J. 75, 75-76 (1984) (arguing that the no-fault concept
remains valid but that there are deficiencies in the current law that undermine its oper-
ation); Comment, Michigan No-Fault: The Rise and Fall of Socialized Negligence, 56
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compensable events make administrative savings even less likely in the
medical context.
In addition, any deterrent effect of the present system"" would be
lost under a no-fault plan. The history of the medical profession in
policing itself suggests that peer review would not be a satisfactory al-
ternative.'1 8 In sum, a no-fault solution, if possible at all, is many years
from fruition and is not likely to help midwives stave off the present
crisis.
C. The Insurance Industry
Although commentators differ as to the insurance industry's role
in the present malpractice crisis,"19 it is obviously one of the key actors
and a possible target of reform. There are, however, several aspects of
the industry that make reform difficult.
Insurers earn profits in two ways: from underwriting operations in
which the losses and expenses are less than the amount of premiums
received and from investments of premium fees.' 20 Often, profits made
on the investment side offset any underwriting losses; in such cases,
premiums need not increase.' 2 ' This was particularly true in the mal-
practice area, which many insurers perceived to be profitable only be-
cause of investment opportunity, and not because of possible underwrit-
ing profits.'22 This strategy operated effectively as long as the insurance
companies did not sustain losses on their investments. When losses oc-
U. DET. J. URB. L. 99, 109-20 (1978) (arguing that the no-fault system in Michigan
failed because there was no reduction in insurance rates and no reduction in the
caseload of the courts).
'1 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
118 See Kendall, Expectations, Imperfect Markets, and Medical Malpractice In-
surance, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 104, at 167,
190 (arguing that the record of physicians in policing themselves "is indefensible....
[S]tates should not abdicate their responsibility [for regulation] to physician groups.").
119 Some commentators argue that the insurance industry at least took advantage
of the malpractice insurance crisis and in fact may have invented it. See S. LAW & S.
POLAN, supra note 84, at 161-70. Others contend that the insurance industry was just
another victim. See, e.g., T. LOMBARDI, supra note 84, at 1-19.
120 Investment income is an important part of the economics of the insurance in-
dustry. See Kimball & Denenberg, The Regulation of Investments: A Wisconsin View-
point, in INSURANCE, GOvERNMENT, AND SOCIAL POLICY: STUDIES IN INSURANCE
REGULATION 126, 127 (S. Kimball & H. Denenberg eds. 1969).
21 "On the property-liability side of the business, investment income has kept
many an insurer safely afloat . . . ." Id. at 127.
22 The extended length of time between premium collections and claim disburse-
ments encouraged insurers to write malpractice insurance, knowing that they could
hold and invest premium income to offset underwriting deficits. See S. LAW & S. PO-
LAN, supra note 84, at 169.
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curred in the mid-seventies and again recently,123 insurers were forced
to satisfy claims out of "surplus"-the amount by which an insurer's
assets exceed its liabilities-which in turn reduced the surplus and
made it difficult to write additional policies.1"4 Insurers, perceiving a
danger in relying solely on investment income both to absorb the costs
of claims and to provide a profit,1" 5 sought to raise premiums in order
to decrease their underwriting losses. In part due to unrealistic assess-
ments of premiums prior to this time,1" ' the requested increases were
large, and doctors and hospitals rebelled against them. 
1 7
Certain characteristics of malpractice claims make predicting
proper premium rates difficult. First, the statistical base from which
actuaries attempt to predict cost is minuscule in comparison with other
liability lines,128 reducing the credibility of past data for predicting fu-
ture losses. Second, it cannot be assumed that the conditions existing
during any given base period will remain the same during the next
policy period. Several factors combine to create this difficulty. Of par-
ticular significance is the "long tail" nature of malpractice claims,
under which a large number of the claims on a given policy will not be
made until many years after the policy is written.2 Compounding this
128 Until now, the years 1974 and 1975 were the worst years since the 1930's for
both underwriting and investment losses in the industry. See Roddis & Stewart, The
Insurance of Medical Losses, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1281, 1288. Insurers recently sustained
similarly disastrous losses. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
12' Insurers are required by statute to make a minimum commitment of capital.
See E. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW 25-26 (1957). In addition, they
must maintain a reasonably constant proportion of premium volume to surplus. See id.
Erosion of surplus resulting from underwriting and investment losses thus reduces the
volume of insurance that an insurer can write. See Roddis & Stewart, supra note 123,
at 1285-87.
12 Some commentators cite the "psychological" effect of the increase in losses on
insurance companies as a factor in the ensuing crisis. See Roddis & Stewart, supra note
123, at 1288; S. LAW & S. POLAN, supra note 84, at 168-69.
126 Inadequate premiums were blamed for part of the problem in the 1970's. One
study concluded that the insurance industry contributed to the crisis through poor pric-
ing and that physicians in California had been paying inadequate premiums for 15
years. See NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 52, at 222. A recent example of the same
phenomenon is the rates that nurse-midwives paid prior to the present crisis: $38 per
year for the last 12 years. Telephone interview with Karen Ehrnman, Government
Relations Coordinator, ACNM (Oct. 18, 1985).
12 In the 1970's many state insurance regulators refused to grant insurance com-
panies the large rate increases they sought. This prompted some companies to threaten
to pull out of the business. See T. LOMBARDI, supra note 84, at 5. Where the increases
were granted, doctors protested, and some refused to provide medical services. See
Montgomery, supra note 73, at Al, col. 4.
128 See Roddis & Stewart, supra note 123, at 1294; S. LAW & S. PoLAN, supra
note 84, at 178-79.
1"I The "tail" of malpractice coverage is the time lag "between the date of the act
or omission for which the claim is made and the date of the final disposition." T.
LOMBARDI, supra note 84, at 6 (citation omitted). Discovery rules are primarily re-
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problem is the fact that most medical malpractice insurance is written
on an occurrence basis rather than a claims-made basis.130
Changing social conditions and the legal climate also contribute to
the problem. With tort doctrines in a constant state of flux, and with an
increase in both the willingness to sue and the success rate of law-
suits, 13 1 it is difficult to predict the amount that will have to be paid on
a claim that will not be made for a number of years. These factors have
combined to make the actuary's job-predicting future liabilities on the
basis of past experience and setting premium rates accord-
ingly-extremely difficult. In addition, the insurance carriers' practice
of not settling claims without the physivian's approval,"3 2 doctors' diffi-
culty in obtaining reinsurance,'13 and the ineffectiveness of state regula-
tion'3" have further exacerbated the problem. Thus, although reform of
sponsible for the long tail of malpractice claims. Under these rules the statute of limita-
tions does not begin to toll until the injury is discovered or should have been discovered.
See HEW REPORT, supra note 7, at 126-27. Due to the long tail, insurers are often
forced to keep accounts open for at least 10 years, and over 10% of the actual payments
may be made later than that. See NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 52, at 220.
130 Under an occurrence policy, an insurer is liable for any claims that occur in
the policy year, regardless of when they are filed. Under a claims-made policy, insurers
are liable only for claims brought within the policy year. The advantage of the latter
approach for insurers is that it eliminates claims incurred but not reported during the
policy year and, hence, shortens the time between prediction and payment. See Roddis
& Stewart, supra note 123, at 1297; see also NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 52, at
229 (stating that the claims-made approach may "offer some potential benefits to both
the insurer-by rationalizing his price-and the practitioner-by enabling a more real-
istic decision to be made concerning policy limits"); Comment, The "Claims-Made"
Dilemma in Professional Liability Insurance, 22 UCLA L. REv. 925, 927 (1975)
(concluding that claims-made policies contain a valid limitation on coverage and can be
advantageous to both insureds and insurers).
Medical care providers are often wary of claims-made policies because they fear
having no coverage upon death or retirement. In response to this concern, some insurers
have made a contractual commitment to provide this coverage. See S. LAW & S. PO-
LAN, supra note 84, at 187.
131 See NEW YORK REPORT, supra note 52, at 220-21 (discussing the rise in the
number of personal injury and medicial malpractice cases since World War II); Ep-
stein, Cause and Cure, supra note 104, at 245-54 (discussing the expansion of negli-
gence theory); Roddis & Stewart, supra note 123, at 1299-300 (stating that there has
been an increasing trend over the past 25 years to translate medical injuries into legal
liability claims).
132 See T. LOMBARDI, supra note 84, at 6-7. Removal of the consent clause from
medical malpractice policies might make claims handling more efficient. See id.
133 The difficulty of obtaining reinsurance has had some effect on the availability
of primary insurance, although how much is not known. See id. at 14. Some states
sought to alleviate the insurance crisis of the mid-seventies by guaranteeing reinsurance
on policies that insurers determined to be bad risks. See S. LAW & S. POLAN, supra
note 84, at 197-98.
134 Under the McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945, Pub. L. No. 79-15, 59 Stat. 33
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1982)), insurance companies are
exempt from prosecution for most federal antitrust violations to the extent that they are
regulated by state law. See 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (1982). Although any acts or agreements
[Vol. 134:1001
MIDWIFERY AND INSURANCE
the insurance industry may partially relieve the malpractice crisis, this
method of reform is illusive and unlikely to provide a full answer to the
current problem.
IV. SOLUTIONS: THE POSSIBILITY OF SELF-INSURANCE
There are no easy answers to the medical malpractice problem,
either in general or as it affects midwives. Midwives are the victims of
a set of circumstances that are beyond their control. They are unable to
obtain affordable malpractice insurance, not because of a high degree of
negligent behavior in the midwifery profession itself,1 5 but because of
increases in the number of suits and size of awards brought against the
medical profession in general,1"' and the insurance industry's percep-
tion that malpractice insurance has ceased to be a profitable
enterprise.
13 7
Although a solution to the larger medical malpractice problem is
necessary if Americans are to continue to enjoy high-quality medical
care,1 38 the complex nature of the problem makes satisfactory solutions
to "boycott, coerce, or intimidate" are still proscribed by federal law, see id. § 1013(b),
this exemption has meant that the primary regulation of the industry occurs at the state
level.
Several commentators have questioned the ability of the states to regulate an in-
dustry that has become national in scope. See, e.g., COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: ISSUES AND NEEDED IMPROvEMENTS
IN STATE REGULATION OF THE INSURANCE BUSINESS 182-83 (1979) (concluding that
many problems in the industry are not merely local and that many state regulators lack
the necessary data to address even local problems adequately); S. LAW & S. POLAN,
supra note 84, at 188-92; T. LOMBARDI, supra note 84, at 17; E. PATTERSON, supra
note 124, at 6 (noting that the low standards and inefficient methods of supervision by
some states threaten the continuance of state regulation); Kimball & Denenberg, supra
note 120, at 11-13 (noting that the limited capacity and resources of Wisconsin's insur-
ance department limit its ability to regulate).
133 Only six percent of the country's midwives have been named in malpractice
suits, as compared with 60% of obstetricians. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
16 The ACNM has launched a campaign to convince insurers that midwives are
a safer risk than obstetricians. To date these efforts have been unsuccessful. See K.
McHugh, supra note 3, at 7. Insurers do not accept the concept of a low-risk birth, see
supra note 75, and insist on including midwives in the same high-risk category as
obstetricians.
See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
13 Some commentators contend that the threat of malpractice suits has already
lowered the quality of medical care-that doctors have ordered tests and other proce-
dures not medically necessary simply to preclude later liability. See Defensive Medicine
Hearing, supra note 7, at 166 (statement of Elvoy Raines, Associate Director, Dep't of
Professional Liability, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists) (expres-
sing the fear that physicians will be selective about the patients they treat and that it
may therefore be difficult for some women to find specialists to care for them); id. at 29
(testimony of Arnold J. Rosoff, J.D., Associate Professor, Wharton School of Business,
University of Pennsylvania) ("If the system, including the underlying malpractice in-
surance system, cannot adapt to and support . . . changes [in the tort system], severe
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difficult and unlikely to be implemented for many years. Rather than
wait for uncertain solutions, midwives should take a lesson from their
own history and realize that they may have to solve the current insur-
ance problem on their own. One way the ACNM can achieve this is to
self-insure. If feasible, self-insurance will relieve midwives of the diffi-
culty they have faced in obtaining affordable insurance in the commer-
cial market.
A. The Mechanics of Self-Insurance
There are two alternatives to commercial insurance: to insure cap-
tively or to self-insure. Both methods are operated by those who want
to be insured; hence, both methods, though distinguished below, will be
called "self-insurance."
In a captive insurance arrangement, the association or hospital ac-
tually forms and owns its own insurance company.1"9 A captive insurer
closely resembles a commercial carrier. It collects premiums and main-
tains a capital fund, but it is limited to providing insurance to its owner
group. 4° A number of hospital and physician groups have utilized this
method, and many have been successful.
1 41
effects on the quality, cost and availability of health care will result.").
139 See M. SUMNER, THE DOLLARS AND SENSE OF HOSPITAL MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE 59 (1979). A captive insurance carrier is an "incorporated insurance opera-
tion designed to take care of the insurance needs of its parent organization, owner, or
sponsor." Id. at 91. "The captive insurer can be organized as a stock company, a mu-
tual, or a reciprocal (that is, an arrangement whereby each insured assumes a propor-
tionate share of every risk being pooled, except its own)." Id. At least one state provides
for the formation and licensing of captive insurance companies. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
8, § 141 (1984). Many have been formed offshore in places such as Bermuda and the
Cayman Islands because insurance regulation is minimal under those governments. See
M. SUMNER, supra, at 61; Jennings, A Tour of Leading Captive Havens, Nat'l Un-
derwriter, Mar. 4, 1983, at 59.
140 See M. SUMNER, supra note 139, at 59. Some companies have made efforts to
diversify into other lines of insurance, because of higher-than-anticipated investment
returns and low volume of paid claims. See A Crisis For Do-It-Yourself Malpractice
Insurers, Bus. WK., Apr. 14, 1980, at 66.
14' The Harvard-affiliated medical facilities formed an insurance company in
1976. They reported net savings of three million dollars during their first year. See M.
SUMNER, supra note 139, at 61. Some physician-owned companies also have been suc-
cessful. See Defensive Medicine Hearing, supra note 7, at 133-35 (statement of NOR-
CAL Mutual Insurance Co., a physician-owned, nonprofit insurance company in
Northern California) (claiming to have an 85% success rate in cases litigated and to
have kept premium levels stable since 1975, the pure premium rate having increased by
only about 20%); Rosenberg, Doctor-Owned Malpractice Carriers: Who's Winning,
Who's Losing, MED. ECON., Oct. 1, 1984, at 62, 63-64 (stating that three physician-
owned companies in California have received an "A" rating from A.M. Best Co., the
organization that monitors carrier performance, and that the 2,500-member Physicians
Protective Trust Fund in Florida is in its ninth year of successful operations). There
have been some failures as well. The Florida Physicians' Insurance Reciprocal, one of
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Under the self-insurance method, 42 an association or hospital in-
sures itself but does not actually form a separate insurance company.
The self-insuring entity expects to absorb losses up to a certain amount
and purchases reinsurance to cover losses beyond that amount. 4" The
self-insurer establishes a reserve fund to pay for claims incurred during
a year and is free from taxes144 and regulations1 45 that apply to other
insurance carriers, including captive companies. The ACNM will have
to examine the advantages and disadvantages of the two alternatives
and determine which will provide the greatest benefit.
B. The Benefits of Self-Insurance
Both self-insurance and captive insurance systems offer a number
of benefits to nurse-midwives. Unlike commercial carriers, a self-in-
surer is not influenced by a profit-making objective; 4" if any profits are
made, they can be used to accumulate reserves and reduce premiums.
In addition, financial savings could be realized with respect to both bro-
kers' fees and administrative costs.'
47
the 10 largest physician-owned companies, has been placed in rehabilitation and is now
being managed by the state's insurance department. See id. at 63. The Physicians and
Surgeons Insurance Exchange of Los Angeles was declared insolvent, and its assets and
obligations have been assumed by a commercial carrier. See id.
142 There is some intellectual controversy over the use of the term "self-insur-
ance." Some commentators argue that since insurance consists of a transfer of risk, self-
insurance is theoretically impossible: one cannot transfer risk to oneself. If self-insur-
ance is defined as a pooling of exposure units, however, the term is accurate. See H.
DENENBERG, R. EILERS, J. MELONE & R. ZELTEN, RISK AND INSURANCE 125 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as DENENBERG & EILEs]; E. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK
AND INSURANCE 30 (4th ed. 1986).
143 See M. SUMNER, supra note 139, at 60. Under self-insurance, "[a]n enterprise
such as a hospital retains the malpractice risk up to a level limited by its financial
capacity. It appropriates, in advance, reserve funds to meet probable losses. If the funds
are insufficient to pay the actual losses, the enterprise must absorb the difference." Id.
at 94. Reinsurance transfers coverage of risks from one insurer to another. See
DENENBERG & EILERS, supra note 142, at 599. It is an ordinary facet of the insurance
business and is not peculiar to self-insurance. Id. at 598-600.
144 A self-insurer avoids paying the state premium taxes paid by commercial and
captive insurers, which can be as high as five percent in some states. See M. SUMNER,
supra note 139, at 60-61. There are, however, tax disadvantages as well. A self-insurer
is not allowed income tax credits for loss reserves, and payments to the reserve fund
(except for bad debt reserves) are not normally deductible. See id. at 60; DENENBERG
& EILERS, supra note 142, at 130.
145 The nonregulated status of self-insurers allows them to keep their capital
funds smaller than would prove advisable for other carriers. See M. SUMNER, Supra
note 139, at 60.
148 As commentators have noted, "[Plrofitability is the critical, though not the ex-
clusive, factor in [insurance company] decision-making." Roddis & Stewart, supra note
123, at 1287 (footnote omitted).
147 One of the first known hospital partial self-insurance plans reported a 10 to
20% savings in brokers' fees and a saving of 40 to 50% in insurance administrative
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The most important benefit of self-insurance, however, is the po-
tential freedom it offers midwives from the instability of the medical
malpractice market. As has been noted, midwives are sued for malprac-
tice relatively infrequently.14 This suggests that their premiums have
been rising not because of increased negligence on their part or an in-
crease in the number of suits brought against them, but because these
events affected the medical profession in general. Consequently, mid-
wives have had to pay for the increase in suits and burgeoning awards
against physicians. Self-insurance would eliminate this phenomenon
and would allow midwives to pay only for covering the risk of suits
brought against members of their own profession. 49 Since there is little
reason to believe that the percentage of suits brought against midwives
will increase, 50 the cost of insuring that risk should not be excessive.
C. The Feasibility of Self-Insurance
In determining the feasibility of self-insurance for the ACNM,
three elements must be examined: the ACNM's financial capacity to
establish an adequate reserve fund; its ability to obtain reinsurance pro-
tection for losses that the reserve fund is not equipped to absorb; and
the availability of a statistically stable distribution of losses, which is
necessary for adequately predicting future losses.
15 1
The largest obstacle to overcome is obtaining the initial capital
necessary to establish an adequate reserve fund. This fund "must be
adequate to assure the policyholder that neither investment nor under-
writing losses will prevent a carrier from discharging its obliga-
tions. 1 52 Although the size of the fund would ultimately have to be
costs. See Morris, Medical Report: Malpractice Crisis-A View of Malpractice in the
1970's, 38 INS. CouNsa. J. 521, 526 (1971). This group did not recommend self-
insurance to others, however. Partial self-insurance involves both keeping reserves
against losses and maintaining them for years, "which make[s] the plan of doubtful
value" and adds to the "headaches of being forced into the insurance business itself."
Id. Other hospitals with self-insurance funds have reported large savings. See M. SUM-
NER, supra note 139, at 61.
', See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
149 Michael Sumner's analysis of the potential savings of hospital self-insurance
supports the conclusion that midwives, under the ACNM aegis, could derive cost sav-
ings from self-insurance. Sumner concludes that "[h]ospitals that historically have had
better loss experience than most other hospitals may derive cost savings from self-insur-
ance . . . ... See M. SUMNER, supra note 139, at 64. Since midwives have "historically
had better loss experience" than obstetricians, they should also derive savings from self-
insurance.
150 See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
's' See M. SUMNER, supra note 139, at 62-63.
152 Id. at 37. Most liability insurers maintain a capital fund with a ratio of one
dollar of capital for every three dollars of premium collected. See id. at 85. Some ex-
perts argue, however, that it is necessary for malpractice insurers to maintain a lower
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determined by an insurance expert, one can get some idea of what
amount is necessary by examining industry standards and applying in-
dustry methods. In any event, the size of the capital fund maintained by
the ACNM will affect the cost of premiums. If the ACNM wishes to
keep premiums relatively low, it will have to establish an adequate cap-
ital fund.
In determining the size of the capital fund, the ACNM would
likely use the risk-retention method. This method is useful to small
carriers that have a large variation in the size of losses and a relatively
low incidence of claims.153 In calculating a capital fund under this
method, "[t]he carrier estimates the maximum number and cost of un-
expected claims, and then sets aside into its capital fund monies equal
to the total cost. Funds are, therefore, available to pay for unexpected
claims without forcing the carrier into bankruptcy. ' 154 If, for example,
the ACNM expected to experience ten claims per year and retained a
risk of $50,000 on each claim,155 the minimum size of the capital fund
would be $500,000.11"
That figure represents only the amount needed for the capital fund
and does not include funds needed to pay for administrative costs and
the like. Because a large sum of money is necessary for the ACNM to
institute a self-insurance system, much thought must be given to possi-
ble sources for the necessary funds.
Some physician-owned companies financed their capital funds
through loans from policyholders.15 Although the ACNM could obtain
a portion of the necessary funds in this way, the option is limited be-
cause nurse-midwives earn far less and are fewer in number than
ratio of premium-to-capital because of the greater risk involved. Some studies have
suggested a ratio between 0.6-to-1 and 0.8-to-I: ten dollars in the capital fund to sup-
port six to eight dollars in premiums. Id. at 86.
18I See id. The low frequency of occurrence precludes the use of more sophisti-
cated methods using probability theory. The risk-retention method is also used to mini-
mize the possibility of insolvency. See id. at 86-87.
154 Id. at 86.
155 Retaining an amount of "risk" on a claim simply means that the primary
insurer is liable for that amount on each claim and that the reinsurer is liable for any
amount over the amount retained.
186 Michael Sumner provides a similar example and suggests that a prudent car-
rier would maintain a fund even larger than that estimated by the risk-retention
method in anticipation of the possibility that more than the usual number of claims
might occur. See M. SUMNER, supra note 139, at 87.
157 One physician-owned company in New York obtained a loan of $1,750 from
each policyholder when it began operations. See S. LAW & S. POLAN, supra note 84, at
203. Various medical societies have lent captive companies money as well. See id. at
202. It took NORCAL, a physician-owned, nonprofit insurance company in Northern
California founded in 1975, until 1984 to pay off the loans made to it by policyholders.
See Defensive Medicine Hearing, supra note 7, at 135 (statement of NORCAL).
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doctors.
The ACNM could also try to obtain some of the funds from pri-
vate foundations or to explore the possibility of forming a stock ingur-
ance carrier and raising money through the public sale of its stock. 5 '
Another option is to look to the federal government for assistance.
One approach the ACNM has used in its effort to obtain insur-
ance has been to ask Congress to establish a federally sponsored pro-
gram of reinsurance.1 59 The logic behind this tactic is that if private
carriers had a readily available source of reinsurance they would be
more willing to insure midwives.10  Even if this assumption turned out
to be correct, however, midwives would remain at the mercy of com-
mercial carriers for primary insurance. Moreover, current skyrocketing
federal deficits make it unlikely that Congress will be willing to appro-
priate the necessary funds.
Rather than asking Congress to get involved in the administration
of a reinsurance fund and the large concomitant expense that adminis-
tering such a program would entail, the ACNM should seek a federally
guaranteed loan to capitalize the reserve fund of a self-insurance pro-
gram." 1 This option would prove less expensive for the government
than sponsorship of a reinsurance fund because funds would be appro-
priated only to cover a default. Securing a federally guaranteed loan is
politically possible: the federal government has a history of bailing out
industries and associations in need.
1 6 2
The various federal loan guarantee programs "seek to resolve spe-
cific socioeconomic problems in order to serve the general wel-
158 According to Karen Ehrnman, Government Relations Coordinator of the
ACNM, the organization is currently exploring both of these options. One study on the
feasibility of self-insurance, including possible sources of capital, has already been com-
pleted, and another has been commissioned. Telephone interview with Karen
Ehrnman, ACNM (Nov. 13, 1985).
23 See K. McHugh, supra note 3, at 11.
160 This conclusion is debatable. Some commentators argue that the unavailability
of reinsurance sources is not a significant reason for the primary insurers' refusal to
provide coverage. See HEW REPORT, supra note 7, at 547; T. LOMBARDI, supra note
84, at 14.
161 Federal loan guarantees have been used for a number of years to bail out other
governments, private enterprises, and individuals, on the grounds that these borrowers
would have difficulty obtaining financing at affordable rates without federal assistance
and that consequently important socioeconomic interests would go unserved. See Brook
& Cheever, The Federal Loan Guarantee Program: A Unified Approach, 10 J. CORP;
L. 185 (1984). For example, loan guarantees have been given to Chrysler Corp. and
New York City. See id. at 200.
11, There are currently 170 different federal plans. See id. at 190. These pro-
grams include loan guarantees to encourage the development of synthetic fuel research,
to provide housing in developing countries, to keep New York City and Chrysler Corp.
afloat, to assist consumer cooperatives, and to purchase aircraft. See id. at 228.
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fare . . ,,163 General welfare is broadly defined;1 64 assuring the con-
tinued existence of the midwifery profession falls into the scope of the
term for several reasons, including reduction of the overall cost of
health care, care for the poor, and reduction of the number of low-
birth-weight babies, which in turn reduces the infant mortality rate.6 5
Finally, perhaps just as important as financial considerations and bene-
fits to the poor, the existence of midwives is necessary to preserve a
woman's right to exercise childbearing choices.' 66 The federal govern-
ment should respect this right and help to preserve it whenever possi-
ble. Congress should therefore be willing to grant the ACNM a feder-
ally guaranteed loan.
Once capitalization requirements have been met, the ACNM
would have to obtain reinsurance to cover the risks that the reserve
fund is not capable of absorbing. This need does not seem to be an
insurmountable obstacle. The availability of reinsurance is not consid-
ered a major problem in the current malpractice crisis, 67 and physi-
cian-owned companies have succeeded in obtaining it.
The last obstacle the ACNM faces is largely a result of the rela-
tively small number of midwives. This fact, along with the unpredict-
able nature of malpractice claims in general, may preclude a statisti-
cally sound projection of future losses based on the frequency and
severity of losses in the past.6 " The statistical sample of past losses,
however, could be expanded by joining with other nurse-practitioner
16I See id. at 199. For example, the federal government has sought to address the
following problems through guaranteed loan programs: "the lack of affordable mort-
gage money for low-income families, the inability of some students to pay the cost of
higher education, and the high cost of air pollution control financing for small busi-
nesses." Id. at 199 n.109.
'4 As commentators have recently pointed out, "[T]here are very few federal pro-
grams which actually promote the well-being of all citizens; most programs serve the
interest of 'a partial public,' perhaps a very small number of citizens." Id. at 214 (foot-
note omitted). Midwifery serves more than just a "partial public," however; the major-
ity of women of childbearing age are potential midwife clients.
165 See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
166 See supra note 47-54 and accompanying text; Note, Childbearing and Nurse-
Midwives: A Woman's Right to Choose, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 661, 682-93 (1983) (argu-
ing that a woman has a constitutional privacy right to make decisions regarding her
child's birth).
167 See HEW REPORT, supra note 7, at 547 ("It seems highly doubtful that any
established carrier has not entered the malpractice field because of weakness in the
reinsurance market."); T. LOMBARDI, supra note 84, at 14 (describing the argument of
one reinsurer that reinsurers write only eight to nine percent of the total volume and
that "an 8% tail does not wag a 92% dog").
168 Past experience is examined in order to predict future losses. DENENBERG &
EIERs, supra note 142, at 129. If the statistical base from which prediction is being
made is too small, it can affect the mathematical reliability of the results. See Roddis &
Stewart, supra note 123, at 1294.
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groups in a self-insurance program.6 9
Although self-insurance is not an ideal solution, it appears to be
the only one that the ACNM can hope to accomplish at the present
time. If the ACNM takes this approach, it will have to hire insurance
experts to study the data and to determine the ultimate feasibility of
such a system, and that process will consume time and money. Never-
theless, the alternative of waiting for a solution that will depend on a
compromise among the many actors that have a vital interest in this
highly intractable problem, including state and federal governments,
doctors, lawyers, and the insurance industry, seems to be both naive
and unwise.
CONCLUSION
Midwives provide a valuable service for many members of our so-
ciety. The continued availability of their services is currently threatened
by the cost of medical malpractice insurance.
The problem of the availability and high cost of insurance extends
beyond midwives to physicians and other businesses. Although consid-
erable effort has been expended to devise a solution to the overall prob-
lem, the causes of the problem are complex and difficult to solve.
Therefore, prior attempts at reform have been unsuccessful.
To avoid the ultimate extinction of the midwifery profession due
to the lack of malpractice insurance, the ACNM should explore the
possibility of self-insurance. Since the preservation of midwifery is in
the general welfare, the federal government should help finance the
capital fund that the ACNM would need in order to establish a self-
insurance program. Such a program would provide an affordable
source of malpractice insurance that is not presently available in the
commercial market.
"" This alternative has been considered by the ACNM. Telephone interview with
Karen Ehrnman, Government Relations Coordinator, ACNM (Nov. 13, 1985). An-
other benefit of such a plan is that a greater amount of the capital fund could be
obtained from policyholders and that a smaller loan would be necessary.
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